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ESTABLISHMENT’S POLITICAL PRIORITY TO
FREE EXERCISE
Marc O. DeGirolami*
Americans are beset by disagreement about the First Amendment. Progressive
scholars are attacking the venerable liberal view that First Amendment rights must not
be constricted to secure communal, political benefits. To prioritize free speech rights,
they say, reflects an unjust inflation of individual interest over our common political
commitments. These disagreements afflict the Religion Clauses as well. Critics claim
that religious exemption has become more important than the values of disestablishment
that define the polity. Free exercise exemption, they argue, has subordinated
establishment.
This Article contests these views. The fundamental rules and norms constituting
the political regime—what the Article calls “the establishment”—have now, and have
always had, political priority to rights of exemption from it. This basic claim may be
narrowed to the issue of church and state, but it is simply a more focused version of the
same thing: the establishment’s civil religion—the set of transcendent, church-state
propositions that support the political regime’s legitimacy and authority—has political
priority to rights of exemption from it. Narrowed further, the basic claim also reflects
the dynamics of Religion Clause doctrine: religious exemption’s contemporary
ascendance is an epiphenomenal consequence of the civil religion dismantling effected
by the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause doctrine in the twentieth century and
consolidated by the Court in the twenty-first. Though today’s most divisive law and
religion controversies often take surface-level legal shape as conflicts about free exercise
exemption, their deeper source is a long-gestating transformation in the nature of the
American political regime’s civil religion establishment. Today’s free exercise cases are
the latest skirmishes in yesterday’s disestablishment wars. They reflect disagreements
over how best to characterize the work of the dismantlers, as well as efforts toward
consolidation of that work to achieve a new civil religion regime. And what they show
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is that in twenty-first century America, just as ever, establishment still takes political
priority to free exercise.

INTRODUCTION
Americans are beset by disagreement about the First Amendment.
Progressive scholars are attacking the liberal view, famously associated
with Ronald Dworkin, that First Amendment rights are “trumps” such
that it is wrong to constrict them to secure “overall benefit.” 1 Jamal
Greene, for example, has argued that rather than “tak[ing] rights
seriously,” we should be taking them “reasonably,” limiting them by
the requirements of justice and what binds the political community. 2
Anything more reflects an unjust inflation of individual interest over
our common political commitments. 3 Many others have criticized the
hypertrophy of free speech and argued for constricting its scope. 4
Rights, the new constrictors say, 5 now have unwarranted political and
legal priority to our shared values.
These disagreements afflict the Religion Clauses as well. The
hotbed of law-and-religion conflict has moved from establishment to
free exercise. 6 All of the latest culture-war controversies are about free
exercise, 7 not establishment, including the fights about occupancy
1 RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW
POLITICAL DEBATE 31, 34 (2006) [hereinafter DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY]; see RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 191 (1977).
2 Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court 2017 Term—Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 28, 38, 58, 60 (2018).
3 See JAMAL GREENE, HOW RIGHTS WENT WRONG: WHY OUR OBSESSION WITH RIGHTS
IS TEARING AMERICA APART 58 (2021).
4 For a very partial list of academic critiques of the hyper-expansion of First
Amendment rights, see: MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION (2019);
ANTHONY LEAKER, AGAINST FREE SPEECH (2020); BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON
READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2015); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE
FIRST AMENDMENT? (2016); Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1119 (2015); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, “Live Free or Die”—Liberty and the First Amendment, 78
OHIO ST. L.J. 917 (2017); Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2016);
Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant
Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (2017).
5 For the new “rights constrictors,” see Marc O. DeGirolami, The Sickness unto Death
of the First Amendment, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 751, 782–801 (2019).
6 See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, The Supreme Court 2013 Term—Comment: The Hobby Lobby
Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture
Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839 (describing the most heated sites of contestation today as all
concerning exemption, not establishment). Objections in principle to religious exemption
have also proliferated recently, something that was far less common in an earlier time. See,
e.g., Marvin Lim & Louise Melling, Inconvenience or Indignity? Religious Exemptions to Public
Accommodations Laws, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 705 (2014); Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public
Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons to Say No, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177 (2015).
7 See infra at Part III for a catalog.
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restrictions on religious institutions because of the COVID-19
epidemic. 8 Decisions at one time raising Establishment Clause issues
are now fought on free exercise terrain. 9 The few establishment cases
have generated far less controversy. 10 Rights constrictors argue that
religious exemption has become more important than the values of
establishment defining the polity. 11 The swelling of free exercise has
wrought, some say, the “quiet demise of the . . . separation of church
and state.” 12
This Article contests these views. The fundamental rules, norms,
and settlements constituting the political regime—what this Article
calls “the establishment”—have now, and have always had, political
priority to rights of exemption from it. 13 The establishment includes
religion as traditionally defined and understood, but it is broader than
that. It is the set of foundational laws and values of the political
community, including its laws about religion: for example, what counts
as “religion,” what types of religion are tolerated, and which
communal considerations are important enough to override religious
interests. Establishment Clause doctrine is only one component of the
establishment. 14 “Civil religion,” the set of transcendent, church-state
propositions that support the political regime’s legitimacy and

8 See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021)
(mem.); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam);
Danville Christian Acad., Inc. v. Beshear, 141 S. Ct. 527 (2020); see also Mark L. Movsesian,
Law, Religion, and the COVID-19 Crisis, J.L. & RELIGION FIRSTVIEW, Feb. 2, 2022, at 1.
9 The issue of government funding of religious institutions is the clearest example.
See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020); Trinity Lutheran
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
10 See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019); Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014). The ministerial exception cases have been held to implicate
both Clauses. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020);
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
11 See infra at Part III for a representative selection of scholarship making these
claims.
12 Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, The Quiet Demise of the
Separation of Church and State, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/06/08/opinion/us-constitution-church-state.html? [https://perma.cc/6JXX-DNV9]; see
also Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, Churches Have Been
Hypocritical During the Pandemic, WASH. POST (May 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/outlook/2020/05/13/churches-have-been-astonishingly-hypocritical-duringpandemic/ [https://perma.cc/SH7E-RD6D].
13 For further discussion of the meaning of political regime, see Part I.
14 To keep these senses of “establishment” distinct, this Article uses “the
establishment” or “the political regime” to designate the broader understanding and
“Establishment Clause” to indicate the narrower, purely doctrinal meaning. While they are
different, the latter is a part of the former.
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authority, is another. 15 Finally, by “political priority,” the Article
means three things: (1) conceptual priority, meaning dependence on
another political settlement; (2) historical priority, meaning temporal
precedence; and (3) priority of importance, meaning greater political
significance.
The establishment, on this understanding, has political priority to
rights of exemption from it. This basic claim may be narrowed to the
issue of church and state, but it is simply a more focused version of the
same thing: the establishment’s civil religion has political priority to
rights of exemption from it. Narrowed further, the basic claim also
reflects the dynamics of Religion Clause doctrine. Free exercise
exemption’s contemporary ascendance is an epiphenomenal
consequence of the civil religion dismantling effected by the Supreme
Court in the twentieth century and consolidated by it in the twentyfirst. The Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine never has been solely
about prohibiting formally recognized, state-operated churches. Its
reach has been much broader, controlling, influencing, and altering
many features of the American establishment. And it is only because
the Court, in its Establishment Clause doctrine, first dismantled the
existing civil religion and shaped the direction of a different civil
religion—even if incomplete, partially unexpressed, and still
evolving—that it could turn to the secondary task of determining the
function and scope of free exercise exemption.
Yet it is exactly liberal regimes like the United States, which
ostensibly privilege individual rights like religious exemption, that
might challenge this Article’s thesis. Indeed, the liberal rhetoric of
rights such as religious free exercise in America might even suggest
that rights of exemption are antecedent politically to the
establishment. This is precisely the complaint of today’s rights
constrictors, who argue that the establishment, in the sense of our
common American commitments, has been subordinated to a
conception of individual rights run amok.
This Article takes up and rejects that challenge. Drawing from
classical political regime theory, the Article argues that the
establishment’s claim of conceptual political priority to rights of
exemption follows from the structural relationship of exemption
claims to the fundamental settlements of the American political
regime. Classical political regime theory illuminates and corrects the
distortions of liberal accounts of the relationship of rights and
15 As with establishment, I use the phrase “church and state” in this Article in its broad
sense to mean the formal and informal political relationships of the government to religion.
There are narrower and more technical senses of church and state (e.g., the jurisdictional,
legal relationship of religious institutions to government powers) but those do not capture
the full range of the political reach of church and state needed for a study like this one.
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obligations. It clarifies, as liberal theory obscures, the political priority
of the establishment to exemptions from it. Rights constrictors are
therefore wrong conceptually about the priority of rights of exemption
to common political commitments, and classical political regime
theory explains why.
They are also wrong sociologically. The last century of American
law and religion jurisprudence shows the political predominance of
the establishment’s civil religion to free exercise exemption from it.
But it shows something else, too. Free exercise exemption was one of
the Supreme Court’s principal tools in dismantling the old, soft
Christian civil religion and forging a very different replacement. That
is, establishment is politically prior to free exercise exemption in the
sense that the Supreme Court’s project to change the American civil
religion set the political agenda for its doctrines of free exercise
exemption.
Part I explains how classical regime theory illustrates, just as
liberal theory disguises, that establishment has a powerful conceptual
claim of political priority to free exercise as exemption in America.
That claim to priority is not confined to modern American
constitutional law. Rights constrictors are therefore wrong in
principle—wrong conceptually. The liberal rhetoric of the priority of
rights of exemption to the commitments of the political regime
notwithstanding, free exercise exemption cannot be politically prior to
the establishment.
Part II contends that sociologically and historically, the case for
the establishment’s political priority to free exercise is even more
straightforward and compelling when the focus is limited to the last
century of American legal doctrine. The most important Religion
Clause decisions systematically dismantled America’s longstanding,
soft Christian civil religion. Free exercise often has been described as
an afterthought, something reserved for the exotic, the unthreatening,
and the politically marginal. Yet if the doctrine is considered
relationally—in terms of its overall response to, and effect on,
American legal culture rather than in Clause-bound compartments—
free exercise exemption during this period is more precisely conceived
as one of the Supreme Court’s establishment-dismantling instruments.
Rights constrictors contend that the situation today has changed.
Free exercise exemption has acquired, in their view, political priority
to establishment. And they are not alone. Indeed, progressive-leaning
rights constrictors and conservative-leaning critics of the
administrative state align in seeing exemption as the principal means
to resist the regulatory state’s growing incursions on religious freedom.
Where rights constrictors condemn this development, critics of the
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regulatory state celebrate it. But both believe that religious exemption
is a highly effective tool of resistance to the establishment.
In Part III, this Article disagrees with both groups. Though
today’s most divisive law and religion controversies often take surfacelevel legal shape as questions about free exercise exemption, their
deeper source is a long-gestating transformation in the American
establishment’s civil religion. Both groups view religion through the
lens of liberal theories of individual rights—and religious freedom
through the liberal lens of “rights as trumps”—and both make the
error of divorcing civil religion from religion. Classical political
regime theory again better explains the political relationship between
the emerging, new establishment and religious exemption law.
Today’s free exercise cases are the latest skirmishes in yesterday’s
establishment wars. They reflect disagreements over how best to
characterize the work of the twentieth-century civil religion
dismantlers, as well as efforts toward consolidation of that work to
achieve a new civil religion. And what they show is that in twenty-firstcentury America, just as ever, establishment still takes political priority
to free exercise. The Article concludes by reflecting briefly on the
nature of the new civil religion, and some of the legal and cultural
implications that might follow from establishment’s political priority.
I.

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND EXEMPTION FROM IT

An account of the political relationship between establishment
and free exercise, as well as of which has political priority, requires
some explanation of (1) what counts as the political, (2) how some
features of the political may take priority over others, and finally (3)
how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses in relation to each other may reflect these ordinal
political dynamics. This Part takes up the first two issues, while the
following Parts address the third.
Political institutions are influenced by, and in turn help to form,
other anthropological, cultural, and social institutions, assumptions,
and ends—the nature of the human person, the existence and
constituents of human dignity, the place and role of the individual
within the common good, and so on. There are therefore likely to be
problems of demarcation in any study of the specifically political
quality of establishment and free exercise. Perhaps it is not possible to
examine the expressly political relationship of these concepts without
getting caught in the nets of these other foundational questions.
Perhaps human nature precedes politics, or is at least ineffably bound
up in it, rendering a study of this particular relational issue
impracticable.
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Fortunately, there are reservoirs of learning that can help to
define the political so as to isolate it, at least sufficiently for this
Article’s purposes, from some of these other complex questions. I will
use the term “political” in the classical sense of the “regime” or “the
establishment,” terms I use interchangeably. The regime or the
establishment is the “form of life as living together,” 16 the rules,
structures, and norms that organize the legal order, express its deepest
common commitments, reflect its fundamental constitutive
assumptions, and orient the citizenry (by law or otherwise) toward
those commitments and assumptions. As Pierre Manent has put it,
politics understood as the regime or the establishment presupposes
that politics concerns the “common thing,” the highest collective
projects and ends toward which the rules and norms of the society
orient its members just in order to constitute a political society. 17
The nature of the establishment, and of the best political
establishment, is one of the enduring problems of classical political
philosophy. In Aristotle’s famous scheme, a community becomes an
authentic political regime when it exhibits three features: (1) it is
founded on some conception of what is just, or for “common
advantage,” or in the service of the good life for all human beings,
rather than for partial or individual advantage; 18 (2) the citizenry is
formed or shaped according to that conception; 19 and (3) that
formation is accomplished through laws that penetrate deeply into the
lives of the citizenry. 20 The scope of the laws consequent on Aristotle’s
view of the political establishment sweeps broadly, extending to
religion, education, family life, social morality and opinion,
economics, and whatever else is necessary to mold and accustom

16 LEO STRAUSS, What is Political Philosophy?, in AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: TEN ESSAYS BY LEO STRAUSS 3, 30–32 (Hilail Gildin ed., 1975).
17 PIERRE MANENT, METAMORPHOSES OF THE CITY: ON THE WESTERN DYNAMIC 64
(Marc LePain trans., 2013) (2010). How a political regime derives and settles on its
common projects is a complex matter. Probably what James Hankins has called a
“paideuma”—an “intentional form of elite culture that seeks power within a society with
the aim of altering the moral attitudes and behaviors of society’s members, especially its
leadership class”—has a significant role in formulating and shaping the ends of the political
regime. See JAMES HANKINS, VIRTUE POLITICS: SOULCRAFT AND STATECRAFT IN RENAISSANCE
ITALY 2 (2019) (citing LEO FROBENIUS, PAIDEUMA: UMRISSE EINER KULTUR- UND
SEELENLEHRE (1921)). I set these constitutive questions to the side.
18 ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS bk. III, at 1278b15–30 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ.
of Chicago Press 2d ed. 2013) (c. 384 B.C.E.) [hereinafter POLITICS]; id. at 1279a22–32; id.
at 1280a34–1280b12.
19 Id. at 1275a34, 1276b16.
20 Id. at 1282a41.
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citizens adequately to the common conception. 21 Later political
writers have offered different accounts of political establishments, 22
generally reflecting greater separation between state and society, 23 but
these other interventions reinforce that determining the essential
character of the establishment is one of the foundational issues of
politics 24—perhaps even the first political problem among equals.
The nature of the relationship between church and state is one of
the basic constituents of any establishment, and one of the
foundational settlements reached by its laws. It was, in fact, one of the
six essential functions of Aristotle’s ideal commonwealth—the polity’s
“superintendence connected with the divine” for the polity’s own wellbeing. 25 No establishment is possible without some public manifestation of political concern with divine or transcendent matters that in
turn shapes the basic commitments of the polity. The establishment’s
formation and maintenance of some church-state settlement, whether
one that depends upon a particular political theology—a distinctive
perspective on the “question of how God’s authority is related to the
authority of the state” 26—or on the repudiation of political theology as
antithetical to the regime, 27 is an essential and constitutive choice
21 Id. at 1280b29; MARTIN DIAMOND, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in AS FAR AS
REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES WILL ADMIT: ESSAYS BY MARTIN DIAMOND 337, 364 (William A.
Schambra ed., 1992).
22 See, e.g., POLYBIUS, 3 THE HISTORIES bk. VI, at 293–307 (F.W. Walbank & Christian
Habicht eds., W.R. Paton trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 2011) (c. 150 B.C.E.) (politeia
as “constitution” or regime covering entrenched features of political culture extending to
religion, patriotism, civic virtue, funeral orations, etc.).
23 NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LIVY 10 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Nathan
Tarcov trans., Univ. of Chicago Press paperback ed. 1998) (1517) (dividing types of basic
political regime and observing that the most “unhappy” regimes are those that by their
“orders [are] altogether off the right road that might lead it to the perfect and true end”
of the regime); MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 10–20 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C.
Miller & Harold S. Stone eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) (dividing
political regimes into republican, monarchical, and despotic, and describing the
settlements foundational to each of these regime types). For Montesquieu, a great many
laws controlling civic life—as to education, punishment, the security and defense of the
population, war, the freedom of regime subjects, commerce, morality and custom, and so
on—followed from the “principle” of the regime type that had been established. See
generally id.
24 See generally STRAUSS, supra note 16, at 32.
25 See POLITICS, supra note 18, bk. VII, at 1328b2–14.
26 NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, THE MIGHTY AND THE ALMIGHTY: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL
THEOLOGY 2 (2012); see also MARK LILLA, THE STILLBORN GOD: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND
THE MODERN WEST 3 (2008) (“In most civilizations known to us, in most times and places,
when human beings have reflected on political questions they have appealed to God when
answering them.”).
27 LILLA, supra note 26, at 5 (“The ambition of the new philosophy was to develop
habits of thinking and talking about politics exclusively in human terms, without appeal to
divine revelation or cosmological speculation.”).
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about the nature of the political community and what its citizens will
have in common. Ancient political establishments were “inseparably”
also religious communities, either in the sense that the “gods are the
gods of the city,” or, as in the case of the Jewish experience, that “the
people comes to be as a people . . . by the loving and provident
design—the Providence—of the one God.” 28 Theocracy (rule by
religious figures) has been comparatively rare, but what Peter Simpson
has helpfully called “theonomic” regimes are far more common—
political regimes that institute laws and customs thought to be
approved by the gods and which, in turn, consecrate the
establishment. 29
The concept of “civil religion”—a set of super-political and
sometimes, but not always, supernatural propositions that transcend
the political regime but are bound up with it and are used to support
its legitimacy and authority—is an important component of what I am
calling the establishment. Civil religion is generally associated today
with the work of Robert Bellah, 30 yet it has been emphasized by
thinkers as different and distant as Cicero and Rousseau as a
foundational feature of any successful establishment. 31 The civil
religion of an establishment includes the issue of the official or
formally recognized state religion—what is, for example, the narrowest
understanding of the province of the U.S. Establishment Clause as
prohibiting the equivalent of “the Church of England by law
established.” 32 But civil religion extends well beyond that narrow
question into more diffuse social and cultural systems of mutual
support between the political regime and its most essential and
transcendent commitments.
The establishment therefore encompasses far more than the
question of the formally established state church. The establishment

28 MANENT, supra note 17, at 227; see also JED W. ATKINS, ROMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
139 (2018) (“The English terms ‘political’ and ‘religious,’ ‘sacred’ and ‘secular,’ tend to
imply a sharp contrast unknown to the Romans.”)
29 PETER L.P. SIMPSON, POLITICAL ILLIBERALISM: A DEFENSE OF FREEDOM 76–77
(Routledge 2018) (2015).
30 ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN TIME OF
TRIAL (1975).
31 CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS 135, 156 (James E.G. Zetzel
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (c. 51 B.C.E.) (arguing that “what is most important in
creating a commonwealth” is to attend to the “magistracies” concerning religion); JEANJACQUES ROUSSEAU, On the Social Contract (1762), in THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS 153,
246 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., 2d ed. 2011) (“[N]o state has ever been founded without
religion serving as its base . . . .”).
32 See CONSTITUTIONS AND CANONS ECCLESIASTICAL § III (1604), https://www
.anglican.net/doctrines/1604-canon-law/ [https://perma.cc/R4Q3-MCAT] (Church of
England).
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includes all that civil religion encompasses. This capacious sense of
establishment is hardly unknown today. Indeed, the Supreme Court
and prominent legal scholars consistently use “establishment” to
designate a broad range of super-political, foundational commitments
of the American political regime. 33 To take one example, many
Americans today believe that an expanding and eternal quest for
equality as sameness is a fundamental cornerstone of American civil
religion, and that this quest should control virtually every feature of
American public, and perhaps even private, life. Or to take another,
Melissa Murray and Alice Ristroph have discussed, and pointedly
critiqued, the traditional nuclear family and heterosexual marriage as
fundamental features of the establishment. 34 Or to take a third, many
modern political regimes often seek to define themselves by settling
on what they take to be a decisive separation of church from state or a
division of political from religious authority and influence. 35 Yet even
for them, that civil religion settlement is foundational—politically
definitional.
That every political establishment adopts a civil religion does not
mean that every establishment chooses one official political theology
definitively or repudiates all political theology definitively. Civil
religions are often fluid and dynamic. Likewise, it can be difficult to
identify the precise quality of a regime’s civil religion, as well as to trace
its evolution. Sometimes, as in the case of the United States, the
political regime will settle on an intermediate, unstable, and perhaps
even somewhat conflicting or internally inconsistent civil religion. As
Steven Smith has put it, American “history ha[s] been characterized
by an ongoing competition, sometimes collaborative and sometimes
more contentious, between providentialist and secularist conceptions
of America. . . . [B]oth the providentialist and secularist conceptions
claimed, with some support, to be interpretations of how America was
33 See, e.g., Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J.
1236, 1252–70 (2010) (arguing that the network of laws regulating marriage reflects a
“thick . . . establishment” as well as a “thin . . . establishment” of a particular, traditional
religious conception of marriage as foundational to the American regime, and that this
conception should be “disestablish[ed]”). For the Court’s broad sense of establishment,
see infra Part II.
34 Id.
35 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 23, at 38, 321–22 (politics and religion are “things that
are naturally separate,” and institutions like the Greek city-state were “thus confuse[d]”).
Even for Rousseau, the content of the “civil religion” was comparatively thin and totally
disconnected from traditional forms of religion. ROUSSEAU, supra note 31, at 245–50. One
can hear similar sorts of statements even in the mouths of Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g.,
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (“We have believed
that . . . a [democratic] government cannot endure when there is fusion between religion
and the political regime.”).
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constituted . . . .” 36 Other scholars have emphasized secularism alone
as America’s foundational civil religion settlement. 37 Yet even political
regimes that have chosen one or another civil religion more
conclusively may maintain practices that seem inconsistent with it. 38
As noted, the scope of the civil religion of the establishment is
extensive: it encompasses both first-order questions (e.g., “Is there an
officially or formally established religion in regime X?”) and far more
diffuse second- or third-order issues (e.g., “What are the commitments
or values—the ongoing pursuit of equality, for example, or liberty—
that transcend the polity’s ordinary politics and exist as timeless,
constitutive aspirations?”; “What is the relationship between policy,
practice, or institution Y promoted by regime X with the transcendent
commitments of regime X?”). But whatever its nature, and however
broad its scope, some civil religion always defines the political regime.
That is as true of the American political regime as any other. 39
The relationship of individual rights, natural or positive, to
political regimes is another profundity of political philosophy. 40 But
in this Article, I will narrow the focus to one genre of right: the right
to an individual exemption from the general laws constituting the
establishment. My focus will be on rights of exemption from the
establishment based on individual religious scruple in America, but it
may be possible to make some preliminary and more general
observations on rights of exemption in relation to the establishment.
Rights of exemption are politically secondary to the establishment
in at least three ways. 41 They are secondary conceptually. Their
existence depends upon an existing establishment, a regime, and they
arise only after the laws and norms constituting that establishment are
in place. Rights of exemption, that is, are not one of the laws and
norms of the establishment, but instead responsive structurally to
36 Steven D. Smith, Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School
Prayer Decisions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 945, 948–49 (2011).
37 See, e.g., IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS
PEOPLE, 3–4 (2014).
38 Consider the case of France, which is formally laic, but whose government
continues to engage in practices—such as the direct financial support of religious schools—
that seem at least in some tension with a thoroughly secular regime. See Muriel Fraser,
Church-State Separation in Constitution of 1795 and Law of 1905: Excerpts, CONCORDAT WATCH,
https://www.concordatwatch.eu/kb-1525.834 [https://perma.cc/37LD-HR79] (translating article 2 of 1905’s Law Concerning Separation of the Churches and the State).
39 See STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 76–
110 (2014).
40 See ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at
1134b24 (Hugh Tredennick ed., J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Books rev. ed. 1976) (c.
384 B.C.E.) [hereinafter ETHICS] (discussing natural and positive rules of justice).
41 Part II suggests a possible fourth way, which might be related to the categories
offered here.
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them. The issue of exemption generates controversy because the firstarriving establishment presents some problem that later-arriving rights
of exemption are intended to mitigate or overcome. 42 Second, as a
result of their secondary conceptual status, rights of exemption are
generally also secondary as a historical matter. They tend to come
later, temporally, than the establishment. 43 Finally, rights of exemption are also secondary in importance, because their concern is not the
“common thing”—the shared affections 44 or loyalties that are
foundational to the establishment (however thickly or thinly these are
conceived, however inconclusive, unstable, or complex they may be)—
but instead apparent departures from the establishment.
In sum, exemptions from the establishment’s laws, even where
they are ultimately deemed warranted, are secondary decisions to
apply the politically prior laws and policies of the establishment
selectively and partially. They are thereby arguably in tension with the
first feature of Aristotle’s regime scheme—that the polity’s
foundational settlements be for common, not partial, advantage.
Exemptions weaken the authority of the establishment. They are
micro-negations of the establishment and individual suggestions that
its settlements are perhaps not quite as foundational to the polity as
had been supposed. Exemptions are, in this way, politically subversive.
They are establishment destabilizing.
Liberal democratic states like the United States, which are said to
prize individual rights more than other political regimes—and even to
conceive of rights as “trump[s]” 45—might be thought to challenge
these claims. Since at least the nineteenth century, scholars influenced
by Benjamin Constant 46 have questioned the relevance of classical
42 Not all exemptions must concern the regime-settling laws. But the issue of
exemption becomes more politically controversial when it does involve an accommodation
from such a law.
43 This type of secondary status does not follow inexorably from conceptual secondary
status and must be verified as a matter of historical fact.
44 See POLITICS, supra note 18, bk. III, at 1280b28–1281a4; see also ETHICS, supra note
40, bk. VIII, at 1161a6–26 (“In each of these types of constitution we find a sort of
friendship, to the same extent as there is justice.”).
45 See DWORKIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 31 (emphasis removed).
46 See BENJAMIN CONSTANT, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns,
in POLITICAL WRITINGS 308, 320–21 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1819). Constant’s thesis has in turn been widely disputed. Quentin Skinner
and Philip Pettit, for example, have argued for the relevance of substantive, ancient political
ideas (including liberty and equality as conceived in the ancient world) to contemporary
liberal democratic republics. See, e.g., 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN
POLITICAL THOUGHT ix–xi (1978); PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM
AND GOVERNMENT 18 (1997) (“Constant’s modern liberty is Berlin’s negative liberty, and
his ancient liberty—the liberty of belonging to a democratically self-governing
community—is the most prominent variety of Berlin’s positive conception.”). Similarly,
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conceptions of the political regime to the modern political situation.
What Constant described as “the enjoyment of security in private
pleasures,” 47 later abbreviated by Isaiah Berlin as “‘negative’
freedom,” 48 was claimed to represent the new foundation of modern
political communities.
On the issues of conceptual and historical priority, the liberal
descendants of Constant might even say that rights of exemption are
themselves part of the establishment rather than secondary or
responsive, let alone subversive, deviations. And as to priority in
importance, some might likewise argue that the basic innovation of
liberal regimes such as the United States is to make individuals and
their rights (including their rights of exemption from the
establishment), rather than the community and its common affections,
the fundamental basis of political life. Liberal theories of individual
rights that prize individual autonomy as the ultimate end of political
regimes like the United States may see rights of exemption as regime
stabilizing or enhancing. 49 Individual rights, it might be said,
including rights of exemption, are the “common thing” in the United
States and states like it. The polity’s collective aims, so the claim goes,
are always penultimate and it is individual persons and their rights to
exemption from those aims that are politically ultimate. To take a
contemporary example, consider the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (RFRA) 50 on the axes of conceptual priority and priority of
political significance. Are the religious exemptions it requires best
conceived as foundationally primary to the American political regime,
or instead responsively secondary to the prior arriving establishment? 51
The matter seems contestable. 52
there are direct antecedents of what is claimed to be “modern liberty” in the work of ancient
thinkers. Having broached these disagreements, this Article largely avoids them hereafter.
It does take a view—a positive one—on whether the very concept of a “political regime” is
profitable today.
47 CONSTANT, supra note 46, at 317.
48 See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121–22
(1969).
49 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 19–20 (2008) (arguing that the individual right of
“equal respect” of the autonomous “conscience” is politically foundational). Doug
Laycock’s voluntaristic account of religion might similarly prioritize rights of exemption.
See Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 64–68 (2007).
50 Pub. L. No. 103–141, 107 Stat. 1488.
51 Compare Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the
U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249 (1995), with Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious
Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35 (2015).
52 The Equality Act, which has been passed by the House of Representatives and which
enlarges the ambit of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to encompass sundry forms of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, explicitly denies that
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Turning to religion and the state in America, Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison are often enlisted for the proposition that
Americans have always believed that natural rights preexist and
predetermine America’s political, church-state settlements so that, for
example, official political support for religion of any kind is
anathema—or as Jefferson put it, a “sinful and tyrannical” violation of
the “natural rights of mankind.” 53 “Both,” Jack Rakove insists,
“imagined a republic where religion was wholly privatized,” and a
“society where matters of religion were solely dependent on the
complete autonomy of individual citizens.” 54 Rakove is of the further
view that “these were founding principles of American
constitutionalism.” 55 Natural rights, on this view, categorically foreclose at least certain sorts of establishments. From his characteristically
dour observations about humanity’s natural “zeal for different
opinions concerning religion,” 56 Madison derives arguments for
muting or tamping down the passions that inspire common political
affection and resisting the upward gravitational pull of politics toward
the grand and the unifying. He instead raises up Americans’ individual
“multiplicity of interests”—economic, political, religious, and so on—
as the common foundation of the American political regime while
free-riding upon then-existing cultural supports in the private, nonpolitical sphere to develop higher human virtues in the citizenry. 57
Virtues which, many Founders believed, are in fact necessary in some
measure for a politically successful republic. 58

RFRA may be raised as a defense to it. See Equality Act, H.R. 5, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021); id.
sec. 9, § 1107. If it becomes law, the Equality Act would seem a compelling piece of evidence
on the question of the political priority of religious exemption.
53 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), in WRITINGS 346,
346, 348 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). On the grossly disproportionate pride of place
accorded to Jefferson and Madison by contemporary judges and scholars when it comes to
the founding generation’s church-state views, see DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE,
AND ORIGINAL INTENT 112–15 (2010).
54 JACK N. RAKOVE, BEYOND BELIEF, BEYOND CONSCIENCE: THE RADICAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 99–100 (2020).
55 Id. at 100.
56 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
57 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 56, at 266 (James Madison). Other founders
also made this assumption. See also ROBERT KENNETH FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
JOHN MARSHALL 114–92 (1968).
58 See, e.g., George Washington, Farewell Address (1796), reprinted in 20 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 703, 703–22 (David R. Hoth & William M.
Ferraro eds., 2019). (“Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity,
religion and morality are indispensable supports.”); see also MONTESQUIEU, supra note 23,
at 22–23 (remarking on the “principle” or conceptual foundation of democratic regimes
that “[w]hen that virtue ceases, ambition enters those hearts that can admit it, and avarice
enters them all”).
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For Madison and those of like mind, religion is one such—indeed,
perhaps the archetypal—tamped-down political commonality. 59 As far
as the communal political projects of civil religion are concerned,
religion is simply beyond the “cognizance” or jurisdictional power of
the political regime. Religion is left to individual and private
associational choice. 60 Government’s role is said to be merely one of
neutral non-interference. America prioritizes private free exercise—
individual and corporate—as the first step in sorting out the proper
relationship between politics and religion. There was no “freedom of
religion” of the sort enshrined in the First Amendment in the ancient
world. It is a modern, and perhaps even a distinctively American,
innovation. Individual religious exercise is not secondary on any of
the three axes. It is, so this familiar and oft-repeated story goes,
primary—the sine qua non of the American regime’s political theology.
In fact, this classical liberal picture of America as categorically
privileging individual natural rights such as religious freedom over the
establishment is a distortion. 61 Even Jefferson, in his First Inaugural
Address, affirmed the necessity of nurturing “that harmony and
affection without which liberty and even life itself are but dreary
things” and which establish an indispensable foundation upon which
a polity can “unite in common efforts for the common good.” 62 To
that end, many early Americans “thought that the government ha[d]
a duty to promote religion—consistently with the rights of
conscience,” suggesting at least the concurrence of the establishment
and natural religious rights. 63 Indeed, as Daniel Dreisbach has
observed, it was “a virtually unchallenged assumption of the age” that

59 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 56, at 48–49 (James Madison); JAMES
MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), reprinted in 8 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 298–306 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds.,
1973).
60 MADISON, supra note 59, at 299.
61 As Madison himself recognized. See Letter from James Madison to Richard Henry
Lee (Nov. 14, 1784), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 430, 430 (Robert A. Rutland &
William M.E. Rachal eds., 1975) (describing the more moderate position that “[r]eligious
[e]stab[lishmen]ts,” rather than religion itself, were not within “the purview of Civil
authority”). For evidence that early Americans believed that a prohibition on establishment
of religion should leave ample room for government to make many laws concerning and
promoting religion, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 102–05
(2002).
62 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, AVALON PROJECT (Mar. 4, 1801), https://
avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp [https://perma.cc/W3QL-WJRZ].
63 THOMAS G. WEST, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: NATURAL
RIGHTS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE MORAL CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 201 (2017).
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American republican government required the support of Christian
civil religion. 64
The duty to promote religion, it should be emphasized, was
thought to be a core part of religious liberty as then conceived. It gave
the requisite scope and space, and it erected and maintained the
institutional “infrastructure,” through which American citizens could
exercise their religion publicly as they thought required by their
religion. 65 It may be that the conjoined features of the American
dispensation—an unstable and shifting church-state arrangement,
complicated by state-by-state variation in the early republic, combined
with a firm commitment to the natural right of religious freedom—
eventually made for a comparatively thin civil religion in America.
Individual rights of free exercise were integrated and enjoyed their
proper (but not a dominant) place within the larger American civil
religion. Natural rights might be politically constitutive in the sense of
constraining the power of the government to choose certain civil
religion settlements, but they do not define America’s civil religion. 66
Natural rights were a side-constraint on that settlement: a condition of
the establishment that had to be satisfied but that itself did not define
its substantive core.
Yet even if the natural right of religious free exercise and the
American civil religion are thought to have equal political priority,
exemption from the establishment on the basis of religious scruple, as
several scholars have shown, was not part of the natural right of
religious liberty. 67 The natural right of religious free exercise encompassed a narrow but durable right to believe and worship (within
natural limits), but it did not extend to what Phillip Muñoz has called
a broader host of “religious interests” in exemption from neutral law. 68
64 Daniel L. Dreisbach, Defining and Testing the Prohibition on Religious Establishments in
the Early Republic, in NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: AMERICA’S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION
TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 252, 258 (T. Jeremy Gunn & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2012); see also MARK
A. NOLL, AMERICA’S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM LINCOLN 203 (2002)
(describing a Christian republicanism according to which “religion could and should
contribute to the morality that was necessary for the virtuous citizens, without which such a
republic could not survive”).
65 See Richard W. Garnett, Response, Neutrality and the Good of Religious Freedom: An
Appreciative Response to Professor Koppelman, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1149, 1158 (2013). See the
discussion in Part III for further development of this idea.
66 Thanks to Micah Schwartzman for this way of putting it.
67 See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Religious Freedom in Philadelphia, 54 EMORY L.J. 1603,
1604 (2005); Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Two Concepts of Religious Liberty: The Natural Rights and
Moral Autonomy Approaches to the Free Exercise of Religion, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369, 373–74
(2016).
68 Muñoz, supra note 67, at 373. For analogous arguments as to the nature and limits
of the freedom of speech, see Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127
YALE L.J. 246 (2017).
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True, some have argued that there is historical evidence to suggest that
the Free Exercise Clause might be understood to require exemption
in some circumstances. 69 And others have claimed that religious
exemption is a diffuse but nevertheless pervasive element of American
historical and political culture, a logical corollary of the separation of
church and state in the old, jurisdictional sense of separated spheres
of authority. 70
Even on this view, however, any commitment to religious
exemption depends conceptually on the prior existence of a civil
religion governing the place and function of religion within the
establishment. Rights of religious exemption never constitute the civil
religion. They follow from it. That is, the establishment precedes free
exercise exemption politically on the conceptual axis, and possibly
others. Perhaps religious exemption needs a metaphysics of the
“possibility of [the] transcenden[t]” beyond the earthly city that was
the legacy of another, older civil religion. 71 Or perhaps it draws some
support from liberal assumptions about the nature of autonomous,
choosing individuals and what is necessary for their political wellbeing—yet another civil religion candidate. Or perhaps from some
other civil religion conception.
But whatever the source of support for it may be, religious
exemption’s general advisability as a matter of legislative grace (where
reasonable, where not unduly burdensome to the rightful interests of
the community, etc.) in some ways confirms its politically secondary
status. Lawmakers may make what seem to them prudentially attractive
or expedient decisions to grant exemptions where possible, but they
would be remiss to grant them in contravention of the establishment,
including the part of it concerning civil religion. At a later point, this
Article inquires whether the “strict scrutiny” doctrinal test for religious
exemption imposed on the Free Exercise Clause by the mid-twentiethcentury Supreme Court (and the adoption of statutes like RFRA and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA) 72 thereafter) altered this fundamental political reality. 73
For the moment, however, it is enough to notice that as a matter of the
69 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990); Stephanie H. Barclay, The Historical Origins of
Judicial Religious Exemptions, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55 (2020). I have argued that some
kind of exemption requirement is a possible, though not a necessary, implication of what
the Free Exercise Clause under some circumstances may protect. See MARC O. DEGIROLAMI,
THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 147–66 (2013).
70 STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS FROM THE
TIBER TO THE POTOMAC 301–44 (2018).
71 Id. at 339.
72 Pub. L. No. 106–274, 114 Stat. 804.
73 See infra Part II. In short: it did not.
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political baseline, religious exemption is secondary to the
establishment.
These reflections about the problem of political priority strongly
suggest that as a conceptual matter, establishment takes political
priority to free exercise exemption in America. First come the
regime’s laws and policies concerning the “common thing” that binds
the polity—the establishment—including its civil religion. And then
come the exceptions, to the extent that the establishment permits
them, in the discretion and at the sufferance of those in power. The
question of conceptual political priority is ultimately one of control,
and it seems perverse—it seems a basic misunderstanding of the nature
of politics as the “common thing”—to say that the exceptions to the
regime’s civil religion control it, rather than being controlled by it.
Those who complain about free exercise exemption’s political priority
to establishment are therefore wrong in principle: 74 exemption cannot
precede establishment conceptually.
Perhaps today’s rights constrictors have something else in mind.
Perhaps they are making a historical rather than a conceptual claim.
Indeed, a somewhat different way to test the thesis of political priority
is inductive, focusing on legal sources and their effect on (and
response to) American politics. In American law and religion
jurisprudence, the Free Exercise Clause has, for a large part of the
twentieth century, sometimes been interpreted to require religious
exemptions from neutral and generally applicable law. 75 For the last
30 years, the Supreme Court has adopted a different constitutional
rule, but religious exemption has hardly faded from the scene during
that time. 76 To the contrary, a complex network of federal and state
law has emerged implementing what some scholars have called the
“accommodation regime,” 77 itself a suggestion that the American
political regime does, in fact, consider religious exemption as bedrock.
The question of religious exemption’s constitutional status was taken
up recently by the Supreme Court, and while the Court did not opine
on it definitively, it did indicate that the Constitution may require
exemption in more situations than had been previously supposed. 78
The Establishment Clause, too, has been in interpretive flux and

74 See supra at notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
75 See Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1771,
1776.
76 Id.
77 Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1193
n.31 (2017); Helfand, supra note 75, at 1801; Richard W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations
and—and Among—Civil Rights: Separation, Toleration, and Accommodation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV.
493, 497 (2015).
78 See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
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confusion over the last eighty years, alternatively inscribing regime
settlements of church-state separation, neutrality, noncoercion, and
traditionalist or historically-oriented deference.
Which Clause has “come first” politically over the last century of
American law-and-religion politics? Which has contributed most to the
establishment—to the organizing narrative framework through which
American politics has developed and been structured, dictating the
terms of the regime to the other? Free Exercise or Establishment?
II.

DISMANTLING THE OLD CIVIL RELIGION

This part evaluates the question of political priority historically
during the greater part of the twentieth century. What is considered
the “modern” meaning of both Clauses emerged in the mid-twentieth
century, even if those meanings may be attached after the fact by some
scholars to earlier understandings. In evaluating the question of
political priority by recourse to legal doctrine, I do not mean to suggest
that the Justices were self-consciously acting politically, let alone with
an explicit agenda in mind. Instead, I am interested not in underlying
judicial motives but in what John Jeffries and James Ryan have called
“correspondences” between the doctrine and broader political and
cultural developments respecting the specific question of political
priority in the twentieth century. 79
In the twentieth century, those correspondences suggest what
could be described as a framework of civil religion regime dismantling.
The dismantling was of the political and cultural pride of place
occupied by Christianity in American institutions as a crucial basis of
the American establishment. 80 The dismantling helped to bring about
a shift in the establishment: from the American civil religion of
Christianity, to the civil religion of what will come afterward. 81 The
Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine was one of the primary legal
regime-shifting engines in the dismantling process, preceding the
Court’s Free Exercise Clause exemption doctrine in time and

79 John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100
MICH. L. REV. 279, 281 (2001).
80 Joseph Bottum has defended the thesis of the American Protestant dismantling
from a cultural and political perspective, though his focus is on the “death of the Mainline”
beginning in the 1970s. JOSEPH BOTTUM, AN ANXIOUS AGE: THE POST-PROTESTANT ETHIC
AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICA 80 (2014). This Article reflects on the Supreme Court’s role in
that larger phenomenon.
81 For some inconclusive speculation about what the successor civil religion may be,
see infra Part III.
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importance. 82 That is, on both historical and political-importance axes
of political priority, establishment was politically prior to free exercise.
Yet exemption was not merely secondary to establishment but
disestablishment reinforcing, and in this way, the sociology of
American church-state doctrine is consistent with, but adds something
distinctive to, the conceptual account of political priority offered in
Part I. That account had it that religious exemptions are subversive
and establishment destabilizing. And so they were in the twentieth
century. Even more, however, the Supreme Court’s disassembling of
the old civil religion regime created the framework within which free
exercise exemption would operate. When it did come, exemption
subserved the destabilization of the old civil religion settlement
brought on primarily by the Court’s Establishment Clause decisions.
In a series of decisions beginning in 1947, the era of Supreme
Court dismantling began. 83 One striking fact about the early part of
this period is how negligible a part free exercise exemption played in
it. 84 From 1947 through 1963, only one case concerning free exercise
exemption was decided by the Court. 85 The then-existing, longstanding rule on religious exemption was that it was not required. 86 What
few cases there were concerning free exercise did not concern
exemption. They instead were about state regulation of religious
belief, worship, and speech as such, and even these often presented
themselves as Establishment Clause cases. 87 In the single case
concerning free exercise exemption involving a Jewish-owned business
seeking to disobey a state’s Sunday closing laws, the Court rejected the
view that the Free Exercise Clause required any exemption, stating that
it would be a “radical[] restrict[ion]” on the “operating latitude of the
legislature” to expect, “much less require[], that legislators enact no
law regulating conduct that may in some way result in an economic

82 Of course, I do not claim that the Supreme Court was the only, let alone the
primary, regime-shifter. Other forces had as much or greater influence. But the Court did
its work.
83 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
84 There had been constitutional free exercise exemption cases before the midtwentieth century, but these, too, had been infrequent.
85 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
86 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879).
87 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494–95 (1961) (state constitutional provision
requiring a belief in God); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (ordinance targeting
religious preaching); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (flat tax applied
as to religious speech).
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disadvantage to some religious sects.” 88 Mandatory exemption was
simply not part of the early picture. 89
By contrast, in the generation that followed Everson, the Court
decided a host of Establishment Clause cases that steadily
implemented a strategy of systematic dismantling of the American civil
religion regime. 90 After Everson’s wall of separation, the Court concluded in a suite of cases that the Establishment Clause prohibited:
financial support of parochial schools; 91 state-sponsored religious
displays; 92 religious affirmation requirements for public office; 93
regulatory and licensing laws supporting religion; 94 Bible-reading,
prayer, and moments of silence in public schools and school events; 95
and public school curricular decisions reflecting traditional religious
practices and views. 96 Free exercise exemption was therefore secondary to establishment on the axis of historical priority. It came later.
These cases also are an answer to those that might object to this
Article’s generous use of “the establishment” to encompass the many
features of the civil religion regime. The Court itself did not conceive
the Establishment Clause to apply narrowly to formally established
government churches. To the contrary, it interpreted the scope of the
Clause breathtakingly broadly. Its Establishment Clause doctrines
88 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605–06.
89 It is possible, with significant doctrinal contortions, to describe West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette as a case of religious exemption. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The
Court, however, was explicit that it was “not . . . inquir[ing] whether non-conformist beliefs
will exempt from the duty to salute.” Id. at 635. The case was about compelled speech. Id.
at 634. At any rate, even if there is a vague family resemblance between Barnette and the
typical religious exemption case, it is still true that mandated religious exemption arose
only after the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine got its sea legs.
90 Again, I am not making a claim about motivations but about correspondences and
effects.
91 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
92 See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (striking down the display of a crèche, but not that
of a menorah next to a Christmas tree); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
93 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
94 Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1 (1989) (striking down a Texas statute that exempted religious periodicals from
sales tax).
95 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992);
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
96 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578
(1987).
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impacted an extensive swath of American public life in dismantling the
old establishment and shaping the direction of a new one.
As Steven Smith has argued, the transformative effect of the
Court’s doctrine concerning school prayer is not adequately
appreciated but was especially profound. By combining principles of
government “neutrality” and “secularity,” principles invoked ever
since in Supreme Court doctrine as if they were self-explanatory and
self-evidently true, the Court in Abington v. Schempp imposed a view on
the nation that “religion . . . just is an inherently private affair.” 97 Not
only is that assumption “simply and starkly false” 98 but it also was a
direct assault on the existing American civil religion. These decisions,
operating on the institution of what Jeffries and Ryan have called “the
high church of the Religion of Democracy” 99—public schools—
“erected and reflected . . . a sort of constitutional divide—a divide in
both a chronological and a cultural sense. The decisions subtly worked
to sever the American self-conception that ensued from the
understanding that had prevailed historically.” 100 Indeed, virtually
every one of the Court’s Establishment Clause decisions of this period
invalidated practices that supported, in some cases directly and in
others indirectly, the American civil religion regime of traditional
Christianity, whether Mainline Protestant, Catholic, or more broadly
Christian non-denominational. The new “secularism” mandate had
profound implications for the systematic privatization of what was once
Christianity’s public, political influence on the American
establishment.
To be sure, the establishment had not formally settled on any
particular Christian denomination for its civil religion. It was a more
diffuse affair. Nevertheless, the social and cultural influence of the
Mainline Churches, a small number of historically enduring and
influential Protestant denominations, was substantial. Together with
the Catholic Church, these institutions commanded on the order of
more than two-thirds of Americans. 101 Cultural and political influence

97 Steven. D. Smith, Why School Prayer Matters 3 (San Diego Legal Studies, Paper No.
20-447, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3581192.
98 Id.; see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Church and state would not
be such a difficult subject if religion were, as the Court apparently thinks it to be, some
purely personal avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like pornography, in the
privacy of one’s room. For most believers it is not that, and has never been.”).
99 Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 79, at 312.
100 Smith, supra note 36, at 948.
101 See Benton Johnson, The Denominations: The Changing Map of Religious America, PUB.
PERSP., Mar.–Apr. 1993, at 3, 4, 6; see also JAMES D. DAVIDSON & RALPH E. PYLE, RANKING
FAITHS: RELIGIOUS STRATIFICATION IN AMERICA 114–17 (2011) (providing data on numbers
of adherents across decades).

NDL205_DEGIROLAMI_03_08.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

3/8/2022 11:27 AM

ESTABLISHMENT’S POLITICAL PRIORITY TO FREE EXERCISE

737

aligned in public schools, 102 at public events and ceremonies, 103 and in
the religious traditions of American political leaders. 104
The Court’s post-Everson Religion Clause law reflects regular,
repeated, and single-minded interventions that severed the
connections of political Christianity and American culture—that is,
that destabilized the American civil religion. True, the Court has
spoken more generally of “secular[ism]” and “religion.” 105 Yet it is
telling that the Court has never bothered to define these categories.
To the contrary, it has insisted that the category of “religion” has no
definite criteria at all—or at least none worth formalizing into law.
Perhaps, as in the case of obscenity, 106 the Court simply knows religion
when it sees it. Yet what it largely has known, and what it largely has
policed in its Establishment Clause doctrine, was not “religion” but
Christianity and the influence of America’s Christian civil religion on
a broad range of institutions of American political life. 107 “Religion”
in this period of the Court’s dismantling jurisprudence is more
precisely taken to mean political Christianity. 108 In the post-Everson
dispensation, the Court, wielding the Establishment Clause, became a
kind of censor ensuring that policies and laws adopted across the

102 See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND
WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 62 (2005).
103 See JACQUELINE E. WHITT, BRINGING GOD TO MEN: AMERICAN MILITARY CHAPLAINS
AND THE VIETNAM WAR 78 (2014) (describing the religious affiliation of military
chaplaincies); Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS. J. 1171, 1203 (2009) (Before the twenty-first century, “with the exception of the
Unitarians and the Universalist, all of the congressional chaplains came from Christian
denominations that were established long before the founding of this country.”).
104 See The Religious Affiliations of U.S. Presidents, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 15, 2009),
https://www.pewforum.org/2009/01/15/the-religious-affiliations-of-us-presidents/
[https://perma.cc/VJW4-7LBK]. With implications, of course, for what Presidents say in
their speeches and other public statements.
105 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1971).
106 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 184 (1964).
107 See Marc O. DeGirolami, The Two Separations, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 396 (Michael D. Breidenbach & Owen
Anderson eds., 2020).
108 See Robert N. Bellah, Religion and the Legitimation of the American Republic, 15
SOCIETY, no. 4, 1978, at 16, as reprinted in ROBERT BELLAH, THE ROBERT BELLAH READER
246, 249 (Robert N. Bellah & Steven M. Tipton eds., 2006) (“[T]he American republic,
which has neither an established church nor a classic civil religion, is, after all, a Christian
republic . . . .”). I am less certain that Bellah was right about America’s lack of “a classic
civil religion.” For descriptions of the predicted, but never quite fulfilled, demise of public,
political religion in broader perspective, see JOSÉ CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE
MODERN WORLD 40 (1994) (“To say that in the modern world ‘religion becomes private’
refers also to the very process of institutional differentiation which is constitutive of
modernity, namely, to the modern historical process whereby the secular spheres
emancipated themselves from ecclesiastical control as well as from religious norms.”).
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country were not perceived to provide civil support for or approval of
Christianity, and in turn that Christianity was not perceived to provide
civil support to American political institutions. The Court’s object was
to dismantle the existing civil religion of the American
establishment. 109
And what of the Free Exercise Clause? Things remained comparatively quiet until 1963, and even for a time thereafter. Free exercise
exemption followed in the wake of the Court’s Establishment Clause
regime subversion and was a largely secondary and minor
consideration. Some scholars argue that the Court’s post-1963 free
exercise doctrine, and especially its new approach to constitutionally
compelled religious exemption, compensated for the “special
disabilit[ies]” the Court imposed on religion by the establishmentarian dismantling. 110 On this view, the strict scrutiny exemption test of
Sherbert v. Verner follows “[p]recisely because religion should be
excluded from politics” and constitutionalized religious exemptions
“are merely the appropriate remedy for the damage” inflicted by the
Supreme Court on American civil religion in its Establishment Clause
cases. 111
This view is quite mistaken, however. Exemption strengthened
and reinforced the dismantling effected by the Court’s Establishment
Clause doctrine. Exemption was subversive of the establishment. It is
not only, as Andrew Koppelman has suggested, that “the purported
tradeoff doesn’t really balance, because the majority religions that are
constrained by the Establishment Clause are not the same as the
minority religions that are protected by the Free Exercise Clause.” 112
Rather, all the weights are on one side of the scale. Far from offering
the existing American civil religion a compensating or offsetting
reward, even if an asymmetrical one, exemption affirmatively valorized
a particular understanding of religion’s nature and role within the
American polity—one directly at odds with the existing civil religion.

109 Caroline Corbin describes the breadth and cultural pervasiveness of the old
establishment that the Court attacked in these decisions: “their Sabbath defines the
workweek, their sacred days define state and national holidays, their morality defines the
family and determines when life begins, belief in their God characterizes patriotism, and
invocation of their God solemnizes, dignifies, and authenticates.” Caroline Mala Corbin,
Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1578–79
(2010). Quite so.
110 See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J.
1611, 1633 (1993).
111 Id. at 1613 (emphasis omitted).
112 Andrew Koppelman, Response, Religion’s Specialized Specialness: A Response to Micah
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 71, 74 n.18
(2013).
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Sherbert concerned whether a Seventh Day Adventist was entitled
to a religious exemption from a requirement to be available for work
on Saturdays as a condition of receiving unemployment benefits. 113 In
the background of the case, and explicitly mentioned in the South
Carolina Supreme Court’s opinion below, is the existence of a general
closing day of Sunday, 114 the traditional “uniform day of rest” 115 of the
American Christian civil religion, the existence of which had been held
not to violate the rights of Sabbatarians just two years earlier. 116
Likewise, in McGowan v. Maryland, the Court had acknowledged the
Christian roots of the practice but had upheld it against an
Establishment Clause challenge: to strike down Sunday closing laws
would, the Court thought, “give a constitutional interpretation of
hostility to the public welfare.” 117 Already in McGowan, the Court
worked to cut away the civil religion root of Sunday closing laws, and
to justify them on the ostensibly neutral ground that the government
is entitled to pick some day of the week, as if the state had just picked
any day at random. 118 Sherbert went a good deal further. It disrupted
the equilibrium of the establishment by striking a more direct blow
against one feature of American civil religion: the generality and
political commonality of the Sunday closing day. Whatever else it may
have done, Sherbert certainly did not shore up the civil religion regime
or offer some compensating gift to it. It overcame, in a small but
significant way, what was thought to be the irrational obscurantism of
this feature of the establishment. 119
The Court’s second major free exercise exemption case involved
whether Amish children must be exempted from a compulsory state
schooling law. 120 Both Sherbert and Yoder therefore concerned distinctly minority religions, religions very distant from the Mainline
Protestant Christianity of the mid-twentieth century, and the rituals
and traditions of civil religion fostered by the Mainline and
internalized within the establishment before they were eviscerated by
113 Sherbert v. Verner, 125 S.E.2d 737, 738 (S.C. 1962), rev’d, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
114 Sherbert, 125 S.E.2d at 745.
115 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 421 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
116 Id. (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)); see also McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
117 See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445.
118 See SOHRAB AHMARI, THE UNBROKEN THREAD: DISCOVERING THE WISDOM OF
TRADITION IN AN AGE OF CHAOS 67 (2021) (“[L]et’s be honest: These laws are meant to
protect divinely ordained rest—Sabbath.”).
119 See also the story recounted by Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon that 1963
was a “watershed” date—the year they recall the Fox Theater in South Carolina first
opening on a Sunday. STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H. WILLIMON, RESIDENT ALIENS: LIFE
IN THE CHRISTIAN COLONY 15–17 (1989).
120 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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the Court. 121 Though both sects, as the Court emphasized especially
in Yoder, had a certain longevity and history in the American
experience, 122 exemption victories for them hardly constituted
anything like a refortification of American civil religion after the
depredations of the Court’s mid-century Establishment Clause
doctrine. If, as John Inazu has put it, the “intuition underlying Yoder
is that the Amish are peculiar enough to be given an exemption
without significantly undermining the state’s interest in public
education,” 123 the same is true for any threat from Yoder to the Court’s
interests in its own establishment dismantling.
After Sherbert altered the constitutional calculus for exemptions,
questions rapidly arose about just what counted as a sufficient religious
burden to generate a claim for exemption. One of the Court’s most
important exemption opinions after Yoder provided the answer:
virtually anything that an individual claimant might sincerely
believe. 124 Once again, the Court’s response was decidedly in tension
with the existing civil religion. In Thomas v. Review Board, the Court
held that an individual who objected to building tank turrets on the
basis of conscientious scruple was nevertheless entitled to
In
unemployment compensation benefits after termination. 125
holding that an exemption from these laws was constitutionally
compelled, the Court rejected the view that the claimant had to
articulate an internally consistent set of beliefs aligned at least in some
respects—or perhaps in any respects—with those of other members of
the religious community or group in which the claimant alleged
membership. 126 An exemption was required, the Court said, even if an
individual claimant’s beliefs ran directly contrary to the beliefs of the
religious group, community, or tradition with which the individual
claimed association. 127 Excepting truly “bizarre” deviations 128 (an
exception that has rarely, if ever, been invoked to deny a claim of
burden), the measure by which religiousness is evaluated is the
121 See Lund, supra note 103, at 1202, for the “minority” Christian characteristics,
demographic and otherwise, of Seventh-Day Adventists.
122 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 nn.1–2, 410
(1963).
123 John D. Inazu, More is More: Strengthening Free Exercise, Speech, and Association, 99
MINN. L. REV. 485, 514 n.146 (2014); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional
Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 130 (noting Yoder’s doctrinal
lack of force because the Amish “are a numerically insignificant group in relation to almost
every aspect of American life”).
124 See Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
125 Id.
126 See Id. at 715–16.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 715.
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autonomous believer alone. Religion became, after Thomas, “a
capacious category of personal autonomy or authenticity” 129 that
exemption was meant to maximize.
Here, too, one can see that free exercise exemption subserved a
vision of religion and its place in the American polity subversive of the
establishment’s civil religion. Exemption reflected the view that
religion is individuated, private, balkanized, idiosyncratic, and virtually
incomprehensible to anybody other than to the claimant (and perhaps
not even to the claimant). Religion’s function is socially splintering
rather than unifying. Religion is no longer in a position of mutual
support with the state, but instead in a posture of perpetual
supplication to the state—a state that now shares none of its
fundamental commitments and practices. Religion does not depend
upon the shared assumptions, habits, and traditions of any enduring
community—the “common thing.” It is fragmented politically from
the state.
Under the new dispensation, a claimant’s views need not conform
to any common standard in order to be recognized as religion. Even
more, it is exactly those varieties that run contrary to the existing
deposit of common religion—whether the common religion of the
believing group or of the civil religion of the political community at
large—that must now be granted special constitutional solicitude.
Mandatory constitutional exemption during this period thus
promoted the Establishment Clause dismantling of the establishment.
Earlier nonconstitutional decisions expanding the scope of
exemptions under military draft statutes, the text of which had insisted
on belief “in . . . a Supreme Being,” reflected the same dynamic. 130
Their effect, if not their object, was to liquify the existing sociocultural,
common, understanding of religion—the central case of which was the
establishment’s civil religion—requiring the state to exempt virtually
any private, individual “conscientious objection,” which here meant
any deeply felt conviction of whatever kind.
It is commonly known that these examples aside, however, and
notwithstanding what appeared to be a generous rule, religious
claimants regularly lost under this standard. From 1963 through 1990,
requests for religious exemptions from tax laws, Social Security rules,

129 See JOEL HARRISON, POST-LIBERAL RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: FORMING COMMUNITIES OF
CHARITY 1 (2020). For a classic work on authenticity of the self as the highest modern ideal,
see CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 25–26 (1991) (describing the only
source left to connect with as deep within us).
130 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965) (quoting Universal Military
Training and Service Act § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958) (repealed 1967)); Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 337, 344 (1970) (quoting the same).
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and prison and military regulations were routinely denied. 131 As
William Marshall has shown, the only claims that were sustained
generally concerned the denial of unemployment compensation
benefits. 132 The Court’s “strict scrutiny” doctrine, at least pre-RFRA,
did not in the least suggest that exemption had achieved conceptual
political priority or priority of political importance to establishment.
Apart from these free exercise exemption losses is the sheer fact of
comparative volume: there was simply a great deal less free exercise
exemption doctrine than establishment doctrine generated by the
Supreme Court during this period. The raw number of cases between
1947 and 1990 shows that the Court decided many more Establishment
Clause cases than Free Exercise Clause exemption cases, even if one
includes the cases in which free exercise exemption claimants lost. 133
Of course, the political primacy of a legal issue is not measured solely
by how frequently the Court discusses and develops it. Nevertheless,
from 1947 through 1990, it is notable that the Court was much more
131 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503
(1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 343
(1987); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
132 William P. Marshall, Smith, Ballard, and the Religious Inquiry Exception to the Criminal
Law, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 239, 245 (2011).
133 On the order of roughly 2 to 1 (28 to 14). For the Establishment Clause, see Everson
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Sch. Dist. of
Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Bd. of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Comm. for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Larkin
v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Estate of Thornton
v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985);
Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578 (1987); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Tex.
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). For Free Exercise Clause exemption claims during the same
period (counting generously), see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Seeger, 380 U.S. 163; Welsh, 398 U.S. 333 (not strictly a Free
Exercise Clause case, though an exemption case); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971) (again, an exemption but not a Free Exercise Clause case); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Thomas, 450 U.S. 707; Lee, 455 U.S. 252; Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983); Goldman, 475 U.S. 503; Bowen, 476 U.S. 693; Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989). Walz v.
Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
involve both establishment and free exercise exemption claims.
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invested in its Establishment Clause doctrine than its free exercise
exemption case law. 134 Exemption was a comparative side issue.
After the Court again changed its view of free exercise exemption
in Employment Division v. Smith, 135 however, the country witnessed an
explosion of subconstitutional religious exemption laws in the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, and an assortment of state statutory and
state constitutional analogues. A survey of the cases brought before
federal courts as of 1996 under RFRA revealed considerable religious
diversity in the claimants seeking exemptions from general law, but a
disproportionate number of claims brought by comparatively new and
unfamiliar religious sects without deep historical traditions. 136 As
Maimon Schwarzschild has put it, “for every one exemption case
involving a plausibly Mainline denomination . . . there are surely two
or three, or perhaps five or more . . . involving a sect.” 137
Indeed, after RFRA was held invalid as against the states, 138 the
coming of RLUIPA and the explicit elevation in the federal law of
religious exemption of prison religion was a significant
development. 139 When the nation’s laws privilege one specific type of
religious exemption claim—one that is more likely than in other
contexts to reflect a balkanized, individuated, nontraditional, and
idiosyncratic understanding of religion—that special legal status
inevitably expresses something distinctive about what the polity
believes to be religion’s true nature and function. Religion, on this
understanding, is supported and promoted in exemption laws like
RLUIPA as something like the opposite of its manifestation in the
establishment of twentieth-century American civil religion. Where the
latter was politically foundational, communal, binding, historically
enduring, and relatively unified as Christian (even if somewhat diffuse
in its nondenominationalism), the former is politically marginal and
unthreatening, atomized, privatized, pluralized, and fragmented.
134 Compare the Court’s law and religion cases since 1990, where the numbers are
more balanced.
135 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
136 John Wybraniec & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the Courts: The Judiciary’s
Changing Role in Protecting Minority Religious from Majoritarian Rule, in REGULATING
RELIGION: CASE STUDIES FROM AROUND THE GLOBE 541–42 (James T. Richardson ed.,
2004).
137 Maimon Schwarzschild, Do Religious Exemptions Save?, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 185,
197 (2016).
138 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
139 See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., ENFORCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN PRISON 13–14 (2008)
(documenting the outsized proportion of RLUIPA claims by little known sects or even
individualized religions). The report also notes that prisoners of minority faiths are the
constituency bringing the largest number of religious exemption claims. Id. at 102.
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Religion as a civic activity was demoted from a position of political
strength to one whose foremost national legal expression in RLUIPA
was the powerless and suppliant prisoner begging the indulgence of
the state. 140 “Religion in prisons and prison religions,” Winnifred
Fallers Sullivan has written, “are distinctive products of the modern
state and its ongoing interest in producing certain kinds of subjects.” 141
This is an opportune moment to emphasize that this Article does
not address the desirability of religious exemption. There may be
good reasons to support generous policies of exemption (in prison
and elsewhere) in a world of significant religious pluralism such as
ours, and perhaps even to constitutionalize them, though reasonable
minds may differ on that question. Instead, the claim here is that these
developments unequivocally show the political priority of the
establishment to free exercise exemption in the twentieth century.
Obviously, there were many other cultural forces at work than
Supreme Court doctrine that contributed to the dismantling of
America’s civil religion. But law played its role, and it did so principally
through the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause cases. Free
exercise exemption was secondary in time and in importance in the
establishment shift effected by the Court.
Exemption can certainly be understood as a concession to the
religiously exotic and unthreatening, as many have observed of cases
like Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas. But when the political dynamics of the
Clauses as interpreted by the Court in the twentieth century are
considered relationally, free exercise exemption is more, and
different, than that. Exemption played a supporting role in promoting
the civil religion dismantling undertaken in the name of the
Establishment Clause. Here again, today’s rights constrictors are
mistaken. As a historical matter, the establishment preceded free
exercise politically and set the agenda for religious exemption in the
twentieth century.
III.

RECONSTITUTING THE NEW CIVIL RELIGION

But perhaps things have changed. Rights constrictors certainly
believe that religious exemption today has been unjustly privileged, to

140 It should not be surprising that the religious claims generating the greatest
bipartisan concord today are those concerning prisoners in RLUIPA cases. See, e.g., Dunn
v. Smith, 141 S. Ct. 725 (2021) (mem.); Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015) (unanimous).
141 WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PRISON RELIGION: FAITH-BASED REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 6 (2009).
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the detriment of the political community’s shared, disestablishmentarian commitments. 142 And it is true that the twenty-first century has
witnessed the explosion of free exercise conflict in countless contexts.
From disputes about the rights of corporations and nonprofits not to
provide contraception insurance coverage to their employees, 143 to
religious cakemakers and florists declining to provide services for
same-sex weddings, 144 to religious schools seeking the right to be
included in religion-neutral government financial grants, 145 to
religious foster care agencies claiming the right not to place children
with LGBT couples, 146 to broader political battles concerning the
existence and scope of state religious exemption statutes, 147 and so on,
all of the most acrimonious fights today seem to concern free exercise.
As in much of the rest of American life, some of the latest
disagreements concern COVID-19 and whether state or locally
imposed occupancy restrictions on religious institutions and
vaccination requirements on religious objectors infringe on their
religious freedom. 148 It may be that this, in the end, is the crux of the
rights constrictors’ complaint: religious exemption in cases like
Masterpiece Cakeshop has assumed outsized political importance, one
that thwarts the progress that has been made by federal and state civil
rights and antidiscrimination laws, and that threatens to reverse the

142 For a selection of arguments that religious exemption has become superinflated,
in some cases even trumping the establishment, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for
Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives, Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee Burdens,
38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 153 (2015); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell,
RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of
Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343 (2014); Micah Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe &
Richard Schragger, The Costs of Conscience, 106 KY. L.J. 781 (2018); Elizabeth Sepper, Free
Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015).
143 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct.
2367 (2020); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
144 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); State v.
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019).
145 Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020); Trinity Lutheran
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
146 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
147 See state RFRA fights in Indiana, Kansas, Arizona, Utah, and other states, as well as
Equality Act fights and associated boycotts.
148 See e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021) (mem.);
Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam); Danville
Christian Acad. v. Beshear, 141 S. Ct. 527 (2020); A. v. Hochul, No. 21-CV-1009, 2021 WL
4734404 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2021), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. We the Patriots USA,
Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4d 266 (2021), cert. denied sub nom. A. v. Hochul, 142 S. Ct. 552 (2021)
(mem.).
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healthy establishment destabilization effected by the Court in the
twentieth century. 149
In this, progressive-leaning rights constrictors share something
with conservative- and libertarian-leaning critics of the regulatory state.
Indeed, a widely held explanation for the rise of exemption disputes is
the growth of the regulatory state. The claim is that as the state has
expanded, it has colonized ever greater territory. As much of that
territory was formerly occupied by the institutions of civil society,
including religious organizations in their great variety, occasions of
conflict have increased. So, for example, my colleague, Mark
Movsesian, has argued that “[t]he growth of activist administrative
agencies figures prominently in controversies like Masterpiece Cakeshop.
In part, it is simply a matter of volume. The more regulations, and the
more subjects covered, the greater the potential for businesses to
violate the law.” 150 In part also, Movsesian continues, it is the tendency
of democratic states toward allegiance to the value of what he has
called “equality as sameness” that explains the increasing conflict and
the recourse of dissentients to religious exemption. 151 It is the small-o
“orthodox” religious, Philip Hamburger writes, who have most to fear
from the administrative expansion, because those are the minorities
“that seek to preserve their distinctive beliefs in the face of
majoritarian pressures to conform to more universal liberal views.” 152
Those pressures have special salience, Paul Horwitz has argued, in the
area of sexuality and progressive understandings of equality and
autonomy, 153 and it is in fact just in that area that one still sees many of
the great exemption contests of the present day. 154 Adam White
contends that the “federal administrative state,” which eliminates the
necessary “checks and balances” that would allow religion in America
to flourish if regulated locally and through regular legislative

149 See GREENE, supra note 3, at 147–52 (citing Masterpiece Cakeshop and the thwarting
of state civil rights regulations).
150 Mark L. Movsesian, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Future of Religious Freedom, 42
HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 711, 738 (2019) (citing Richard A. Epstein, Religious Liberty in the
Welfare State, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 375 (1990)); see also Richard Epstein, Freedom of
Association and Antidiscrimination Law: An Imperfect Reconciliation, LAW & LIBERTY: FS. (Jan. 2,
2016), https://lawliberty.org/forum/freedom-of-association-and-antidiscrimination-lawan-imperfect-reconciliation/ [https://perma.cc/N7VE-VF78].
151 See Movsesian, supra note 150, at 714.
152 Philip Hamburger, Exclusion and Equality: How Exclusion From the Political Process
Renders Religious Liberty Unequal, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1929 (2015).
153 See Horwitz, supra note 6, at 160.
154 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,
141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
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processes, is the principal culprit for the plight of religious freedom
today. 155
Both rights constrictors and regulatory-state critics, therefore, see
in exemption an instrument of resistance to the regulatory state. The
former object to this development as granting unjustified privileges to
individual religious interest at the expense of the political community.
The latter praise it after the fashion of the private, associational
recommendations of Tocqueville. 156 It was Tocqueville, after all, who
observed that American democracy’s impulses toward equality and
individualism, with what he claimed were attendant dangers of
absolute, despotic, centralized government control of the citizenry,
could only be curbed and tamed by cultivating vibrant voluntary
associations, the paradigmatic example of which were churches. 157
Religion as manifested in private association can “check, pressure, and
restrain the tendencies of centralized government to assume more and
more administrative control.” 158 Religious exemption, on this view, is
a kind of counterbalancing instrument for courts to wield in forging
deals between religion and the regulatory state—new compromises
between the traditionally religious and progressive government
forces. 159
The regulatory explanation for the rise of free exercise exemption
has considerable force, and I myself have argued for a limited version
of it. 160 It is probably true that governments that regulate comprehensively are likelier to infringe on religion and religious liberty than
governments that do not, though that will depend upon just what
religion and religious liberty encompass. Nevertheless, the regulatory
explanation is incomplete and beset by several problems. Like earlier
“compensatory” accounts of exemption in the twentieth century, 161 it
fails to capture something crucial about the political dynamics of
religious exemption then and now.
In the first place, there is a practical, temporal difficulty. What
has been called “Tocqueville’s Nightmare” is more than a century old
at least, and as Daniel Ernst has shown, what began as substantial
155 Adam J. White, The Turn Against Religious Liberty, COMMENTARY, Jan. 2021, at 32.
156 Movsesian, supra note 150, at 739–40.
157 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 180, 485–92 (Harvey C.
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000) (1840).
158 ROBERT N. BELLAH, RICHARD MADSEN, WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN SWIDLER &
STEVEN M. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN
LIFE 38 (Univ. Cal. Press 1996) (1985).
159 See Mark Movsesian, The Roberts Court Attempts a Compromise, FIRST THINGS (July 15,
2020), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2020/07/the-roberts-court-attempts-acompromise [https://perma.cc/3SBD-M7H9].
160 See Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise by Moonlight, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105 (2016).
161 See supra notes 110–19 and accompanying text.
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judicial supervision of administrative and regulatory action rapidly
became substantial deference to it. 162 By the 1930s, the “old doctrines”
of judicial oversight of administrative rulemaking had “bec[o]me
‘ghosts’ of their former selves,” 163 and subsequent developments as
early as the coming of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 reflect
the early stages of the great “abnegation” of law to administration. 164
If religious exemption and the rise of the administrative state are
connected, that connection does not seem either an immediate or a
necessary one. Exemption only became a preferred strategy to resist
regulatory control in the last three decades at most. Before that, as
discussed above, religious exemption was a politically marginal and
largely secondary, supporting phenomenon in the Court’s dismantling
of the establishment. Exemption’s greatly delayed ascendance in
American law, coming to dominate the law and religion scene nearly a
century after the entrenchment of the regulatory state, requires at least
some other causal account. And there does not seem to have been too
much conflict between the regulatory state and religion for some time
after the former’s arrival. What happened in between to render
exemption such a popular (or necessary, depending upon one’s
perspective) strategy today? 165
And there are other holes in the regulatory account as an
explanation for the rise of religious exemption, at least without
substantial supplementation. Like the rights constrictors’ critique of
the rise of exemption, the regulatory account of it suggests that there
is a necessary hostility or opposition between a powerful administrative
state and religion. It suggests further that with the growth of
administrative power comes inevitably the loss of space within which
religion can shape, influence, and structure a society. Again, rights
constrictors complain about exemption’s obstruction of the
administrative state, while regulatory critics praise it, but their
162 See DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940, at 5 (2014). I say “at least” inasmuch as other studies
have shown the administrative state in America to be far older. See JERRY L. MASHAW,
CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012).
163 ERNST, supra note 162, at 5 (citing Robert L. Hale, Does the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames
Still Walk?, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1116 (1942); Bernard Schwartz, Does the Ghost of Crowell v.
Benson Still Walk?, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 163 (1949)).
164 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 26–27 (2016).
165 If the claim is instead that particular types of regulation, with particular aims and
commitments, caused friction with the American civil religion, and that these arose in the
latter half of the twentieth century, then I have less quarrel with it. But it is then not the
fact of regulation and the rise of the administrative state itself that is doing the explanatory
work.
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perspectives align on the dynamics between religion and regulation.
Yet as discussed in Part I, many other political regimes in history have
had highly centralized and, indeed, by today’s lights, invasive networks
of laws that penetrate the lives of the citizenry. And these regimes have
been graced with vital and flourishing religious traditions that have
provided public, organizing frameworks and influences for their
respective polities. 166 Indeed, as was argued above, these regimes have
deemed the care of religion to be one of the fundamental charges of
any self-respecting polity.
Unless one is prepared to say that these earlier regimes were selfdeluded or somehow caught in a categorical mistake about religion’s
essence, and that it is only we today who understand religion’s true
nature clearly (a position the Supreme Court, at least, has been at pains
to deny), government regulation and religion are not inherently at
odds. One might even argue that the civil religion of the American
establishment before the Court’s Establishment Clause dismantling
reflected such a political regime, as the examples of the Little Sisters of
the Poor and Catholic Social Services discussed below, and countless
other similar organizations before them, suggest.
It was an
establishment in which the state’s “police power[s]” were employed to
promote the “health, safety, and morals” of the polity, 167 and these
powers were regularly put to use for the care of American civil religion
and to promote religious liberty within the regime’s conception of it.
Tocqueville’s views on private association notwithstanding, to the
extent that the mutual antagonism of the administrative state and
religion chronicled by these commentators explains the rise of
exemption, it is a highly contingent explanation.

166 Some comparatively modern examples of regulated regimes in which religion once
played a public, political role may be helpful: France during the period before the 1905 law
of church-state separation, see note 38, and Spain pre-Franco and pre–Second Republic
(before the official church-state separation in the Constitution of 1931), in its so-called
“Silver Age,” which witnessed the expansion of public works and public regulation. For
Spain, and the role of religion in specific, see the discussion in STANLEY G. PAYNE, THE
SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 8, 111–18 (2012). The anarcho-syndicalists of the civil war period were
antiregulation as well as antireligion. Id. at 9. For a description in fiction of the influence
of religious traditions in Spain before the Spanish Republican anticlericalism of the 1930s,
see JOSÉ MARÍA GIRONELLA, THE CYPRESSES BELIEVE IN GOD (Harriet de Onís trans., Alfred
A. Knopf 1955) (1953). My object is not to defend these political regimes (or any others),
or to argue that they or their respective religious traditions did not have problems of various
kinds. The point is far narrower: regulation and religion are not by their very nature
incompatible.
167 Cases using this locution are legion. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S.
560, 569 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion). For discussion of these issues, see
generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888 (1985).
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Indeed, the story of exemption’s concomitant rise with the
regulatory state is not merely an incomplete one. It may mask political
causes that have greater explanatory force. It imports a contestable
and historically contingent view of the relationship between church
and state, in which the two are perpetually at odds in a zero-sum game
for political power and influence. On one side are the public, antiexemption forces of the establishment. On the other are the private,
pro-exemption forces of liberty-seeking outsiders. It sees free exercise
only from the perspective of the private religious dissenter, ignoring
two other important constituencies: (1) the governing power and the
ways in which exemption can serve its public ends, and (2) the
religious citizen or group whose liberty is fostered by and consonant
with the civil religion supported by government regulation. It assumes
that free exercise exemption may only stand in opposition to the
administrative state rather than in an auxiliary role.
In so doing, those who celebrate religious exemption, much like
those who critique it, may obscure deeper causal explanations for
exemption’s rise: in particular, the changing American establishment
and the Court’s consolidation of what it had done to the old civil
religion in reconstituting a new civil religion. In considering the
regulatory explanation for exemption, Thomas Berg helpfully
observes that exemption is the ideal strategy to “temper[] regulation
without undoing it” and thereby to legitimate the increasing size and
scope of administrative control. 168 To help the regulatory pill go down
a little easier, since go down it must. This is a descriptive improvement
over the inherently oppositional, Tocqueville-inflected accounts of
religion and regulation, but it still does not quite hit the mark.
A large part of the problem is that both progressive rights
constrictors and conservative regulatory-state critics conceive of
religion, and so of religious freedom, as entirely distinct from civil
religion. That is, both adopt a liberal view of religion and religious
freedom as exclusively private and individual, rather than public and
political. Again, classical political regime theory is more perspicacious,
and offers a deeper explanatory account of the relevant political
dynamics today, than does a liberal theory of individual rights like
religious exemption as trumps. 169 Classical regime theory understands
civil religion and religion as part of the same political phenomenon,
while liberal political theory scrupulously segregates them. True, civil
religion and religion may not be one and the same, as public political
concern with the divine is not private knowledge of the divine itself.

168 Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 103, 107 (2015).
169 See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
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True also, the former may well be of minor ultimate importance
compared to the latter. Nevertheless, if the object is to offer a political
explanation for exemption’s ascendancy, then the fortunes of
American civil religion deserve pride of place.
This is, in sum, the most fundamental flaw in both the rights
constricting and the antiregulatory explanation for religious exemption: by excising civil religion from the category of religion, and by
focusing exclusively on the early twentieth-century rise of the
administrative state and the early twenty-first-century religious
resistance to it, both accounts obscure how exemption may consolidate
the Court’s gains in dismantling the old civil religion and allow it to
reconstitute a new and very different civil religion.
Consider the seemingly interminable (and not yet extinguished) 170 litigation in the Little Sisters of the Poor case. The Little
Sisters sought an exemption from the so-called “contraceptive
mandate” requiring religious nonprofits like them to provide
contraceptive insurance coverage for their employees. 171 In the latest
iteration of this legal battle, the Little Sisters obtained a bit of relief at
the Supreme Court from state challenges to the Trump
administration’s favorable (for them) administrative rulemaking. 172
What the Biden administration will do is as yet uncertain, though as a
candidate, Joe Biden indicated that he intended to rescind their
exemption. 173 Should we then say, as both rights constrictors and
regulatory critics 174 do (though from opposite perspectives), that this
case shows that religious exemption is a powerful instrument of
regulatory resistance?

170 Editorial, Joe Biden vs. the Nuns, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2020), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/joe-biden-vs-the-nuns-11594336792 [https://perma.cc/NQ68-A6NH]. And the
states, too, may not be finished with the Little Sisters. The state attorneys general of
Pennsylvania and New Jersey were the plaintiffs in the latest dispute.
171 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct.
2367, 2376 (2020) (discussing Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. 403 (2016) (per curiam)). I
recognize that this description is contestable and that there were sundry administrative
permutations and re-combinations (“accommodations” as opposed to “exemptions” and
so on) in the course of the litigation. I leave these disagreements to the side.
172 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2373.
173 See Editorial, supra note 170. Xavier Becerra, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, as Attorney General of California sued to stop the former administration from
relieving the Little Sisters from compliance with the mandate. Louis Jacobson, Did HHS
nominee Xavier Becerra Sue Nuns?, POLITIFACT (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.politifact.com
/factchecks/2021/feb/26/xavier-becerra/did-hhs-nominee-xavier-becerra-sue-nuns/
[https://perma.cc/9PEU-3845].
174 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7, 28 (2017) (observing that “regulatory
requirements [have been] significantly pared back in the name of religious free exercise”).
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It would be highly peculiar—at least, it would require a rather
lopsided view of political realities—to describe it in these terms. This
case as well as Hobby Lobby, 175 both of which were brought by groups
within the heartland of the preceding American civil religion regime,
would never have arisen at all but for the era of the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause dismantling. Both the Little Sisters of the Poor
and Hobby Lobby are organizations that hold to an older view of the
public expression of Christianity in their respective public-facing
work 176—one that fits comfortably under the aegis of the American
civil religion establishment until the Supreme Court got to work midcentury.
That was the religious liberty of these groups. It was the freedom
to pursue their public, religious mission in concord with the
establishment’s civil religion and with its support. But the civil religion
sustaining the public-facing and public-acting Christian religiosity of
these groups suffered systematic Establishment Clause attack by a
Court that insisted on “secularity” as well as “neutrality” in the public
domain. 177 The space within which the type of religious liberty fostered
by that civil religion could operate was choked off—not because of the
growth of the administrative state, but because the establishment and
associated government regulation that had made it possible was
repudiated. True, the dismantling was officially only of “state action.”
But its socio-cultural effects were far-reaching and were not contained
within formalistic public-private compartments.
It is, in fact, inconceivable that in 1963, the year of Sherbert and
the birth of contemporary free exercise exemption, a nonprofit
organization of Catholic nuns doing public good works for the poor
would have faced a decades-long legal struggle against a federal
mandate to provide insurance coverage for contraception to its
employees. 178 That fight is only imaginable today thanks to the Court’s
175 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014)
176 Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2376–77 (discussing the Little Sisters and the
respondents in Hobby Lobby).
177 See note 97 and accompanying text.
178 I do not mean to suggest that groups like the Little Sisters had altogether smooth
sailing before 1963, or that they were not subject to a rich and robust anti-Catholicism in
American intellectual culture before the mid-twentieth century. See generally HAMBURGER,
supra note 61; JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY 163–
213 (2003) (describing Paul Blanshard’s American Freedom and Catholic Power, in which
Blanshard noted that nuns belonged to “an age when women allegedly enjoyed subjection
and reveled in self-abasement” (quoting PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND
CATHOLIC POWER 67 (1949))). Blanshard’s book was a bestseller and critically acclaimed
in 1949 and 1950. Patrick McKinley Brennan, Are Catholics Unreliable from a Democratic Point
of View? Thoughts on the Occasion of the Sixtieth Anniversary of Paul Blanshard’s American
Freedom and Catholic Power, 56 VILL. L. REV. 199, 199 (2011). The point is about
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establishment dismantling (supported by Sherbert and its exemptionist
progeny), and its slow reconstitution of another establishment and
another civil religion. That shift, and not the bare fact of regulation,
is the reason that groups like the Little Sisters find themselves in court
at all. They are litigating because they are now on the losing end of
the new, burgeoning civil religion regime’s dispensation. Exemption
is the only strategy remaining to them in the face of the strictures of
the new establishment and its attendant civil religion. But as with
exemption as it emerged in the 1960s and was illustrated in the
prototypical RLUIPA case, it is a strategy that confirms and reinforces
their supplicant status as outsiders to the new civil religion.
Once again, the point is not to criticize or praise either this
development or the responsive legal strategy. From the Little Sisters’
perspective, a loser’s strategy is better than none at all; and from the
government’s, there may be reasons to grant an indulgence from the
new establishment and its civil religion, and reasons not to. Rather,
the argument pursued here is that today, exemption remains
secondary in political priority to establishment, just as it was in earlier
periods. Exemption only appears as a powerful tool of regulatory
resistance, when its real effect is to consolidate the gains made by the
Court in dismantling the old civil religion. Where Seventh Day
Adventists, the Amish, and other claimants from minor (historically
and numerically speaking) 179 or even self-authenticating (as in
Thomas 180 and Welsh 181) religions once sought religious exemptions
from a position of supplication within an establishment of soft
Christianity, now a greater number of traditional Christians do within
an establishment that has repudiated its Christian past and adopted
something else.
Or consider one of the latest free exercise exemption fights in
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, decided by the Court for Catholic Social
Services (CSS) on exceptionally narrow grounds. 182 “Since 1797,”
petitioner’s brief begins, “the Catholic Church . . . has cared for
children in need,” a project and a tradition that is today carried on in
CSS’s provision of foster homes for abused and neglected children. 183

regulatory control and compulsion, and on that front, the history of their order in America
recounted by the Little Sisters themselves does make the recent federal action difficult to
imagine in 1963. See American Foundations, LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR, http://
littlesistersofthepoor.org/american-foundations/ [https://perma.cc/9XAM-GE6P].
179 See notes 113–23 and accompanying text.
180 Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
181 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
182 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
183 Brief for Petitioners at 3, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2020 WL 2836494, at
*3.
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It was the Catholic Church, not the City, that had for centuries taken
charge of this charitable activity with explicit reliance on its Christian
mission. 184 Even over the last fifty years, which witnessed far greater
government regulation in the management of adoption and foster
care, the relationship between the City of Philadelphia and CSS was
one largely of harmonious partnership. 185 Indeed, the history of that
partnership—one between the regulatory state and a public-facing and
“exercising” religious institution—belies the claim that religion and
regulation are inherently at odds. During that period of accord, CSS’s
religious liberty flourished precisely because it was protected (indeed,
cherished and promoted) by the establishment’s civil religion. Its
religious freedom was the freedom to influence society for the
common good through its Christian ministry.
What changed was not the brute fact of increasing government
regulation of adoption and foster care, resulting in inevitable conflict
with CSS. What changed was the establishment’s civil religion, a
change manifested as recently as four years ago in Philadelphia’s
contractual demands of CSS. 186 The long era in which government
welcomed the partnership and Christian ministry of service
organizations like CSS (as well as religiously operated hospitals,
charitable organizations like the Little Sisters of the Poor, religious
schools, international religious organizations, and so on) is rapidly
waning. These institutions and the part they have played in American
political life are part of the older establishment in which Christianity
had a formidable public and political presence in virtually every facet
of the American polity.
Indeed, it is not only cases like Little Sisters and Fulton that are
inconvenient to the liberal, wholly privatized conception of religion,
embraced by rights constrictors and regulatory-state critics alike. Some
of the most recent and most heated free exercise controversies—
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue 187 and Our Lady of Guadalupe
School v. Morrissey-Berru, 188 for example—concern the same category of
public-facing and public-exercising Christian institutions. All of these
were at least as important a political presence as the one-time ubiquity
of school prayers, Bible reading in public schools, state-sponsored Ten
Commandments monuments, and crèches on city hall lawns. The
purpose of these institutions and these practices, from the state’s
perspective, was not to instill a genuine piety or cultivate private
184 See id. at 4.
185 See id. at 5.
186 Brief for City Respondents at 6, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2020 WL
4819956, at *6.
187 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
188 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
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knowledge of the divine. It was to mark out and recognize the
influence of (and, in the case of organizations like CSS and the Little
Sisters, to benefit civically from) public Christianity on the American
political regime. It was to reflect and reaffirm America’s civil
religion. 189
It is just that component of the old establishment that was
dismantled by the Court’s Establishment Clause decisions, and which
a generation later had the effect of deranging an established (in the
colloquial as well as the regime sense) Christian organization from
pursuing the public, political work that it had undertaken since the
founding of the republic. It is, of course, not surprising that CSS
sought an exemption from the new establishment, the only remedy
that would relieve it from compliance with the City’s mandatory
nondiscrimination contract clause while permitting it to continue its
work without violating its religious principles. And the Supreme Court
gave CSS that relief, in a narrow way. But as in the Little Sisters’ case,
both rights constrictors and regulatory-state critics would be quite
mistaking matters to say that Fulton therefore vindicates religious
exemption as the mighty instrument by which to thwart the regulatory
state or to forge new compromises. What exemption in Fulton has
done is to highlight for CSS, and so many organizations like it, how
much they have lost of their former religious liberty. Exemption is, in
this way, appeasement. 190 It is an act of placation that ought not to
distract from the larger political rout. It is a reminder of the old
establishment now gone.
Indeed, the civil religion of the regime has shifted so dramatically
that some scholars broadly within the rights-constricting camp now
argue that religious exemption in several of these cases violates the
Establishment Clause. 191 There are ongoing doctrinal and conceptual
disagreements about the so-called “third-party harm” Establishment

189 A point affirmed by Justice Brennan in his extended concurrence in Schempp. See
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(recognizing that public schools, which “Americans regard . . . as a most vital civic
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government,” must not impress
upon the future citizenry anything of the old civil religion).
190 I use the term in its ordinary, colloquial sense. Cf. Micah Schwartzman & Nelson
Tebbe, Establishment Clause Appeasement, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 274 (using appeasement
in a somewhat different way).
191 See, e.g., Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 142; Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel,
Conscience Wars in Transnational Perspective: Religious Liberty, Third-Party Harm, and Pluralism,
in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND
EQUALITY 187, 205–06 & n.81 (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2018);
Schwartzman et al., supra note 142.
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Clause claim, but those are not my concern here. 192 Rather, what is of
interest is how best to understand the third-party harm argument
politically and as a matter of civil religion realignment. And on that
metric, the argument vindicates the political primacy of establishment
to free exercise exemption as well as the regime-destabilizing function
of exemption. Religious exemption is no longer needed to promote
the dismantling of the old establishment’s civil religion. To be sure, as
in the cases discussed above, it can still serve that function. But by this
point, the twentieth-century Establishment Clause lessons taught by
the Supreme Court have been well-learned by federal, state, and local
authorities, as cases from Hobby Lobby and the Little Sisters of the Poor to
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Arlene’s Flowers, and Fulton show clearly. They
have been thoroughly absorbed by the polity.
Rather, from the rights constrictors’ point of view, the greater
danger now is that further progress will be obstructed, or perhaps even
that backsliding or regression will ensue, and that the successor civil
religion regime will suffer setbacks. Too many exemptions for too
many groups like the traditional Christian ones that now seek them
might disrupt the new establishment from gaining its proper footing.
While exemption was usefully regime destabilizing for the civil religion
that once was, it is threateningly regime destabilizing for the civil
religion that is now in the offing. Here, exemption’s champions today
may with some justice argue that, in fact, exemption does not always
subserve and fortify the civil religion regime. Perhaps. But it may be
more accurate to say that for rights constrictors, exemption’s regimedismantling function has simply outlived its usefulness at this point. It
is no longer needed to perform that role, now that the old civil religion
of the old establishment has been toppled.
Be that as it may, this Article’s core claim remains undisturbed.
For as a political matter, in the third-party harms argument, it is
establishment that dictates the terms according to which free exercise
exemption operates. Rights constrictors have it wrong yet again.
Establishment still takes political priority to free exercise exemption
conceptually and as a matter of political importance. Just as it ever has.

192 I have addressed some of these claims elsewhere. See DeGirolami, supra note 160.
For other criticisms, see Stephanie H. Barclay, First Amendment “Harms,” 95 IND. L.J. 331
(2020); Carl H. Esbeck, Do Discretionary Religious Exemptions Violate the Establishment Clause?,
106 KY. L.J. 603 (2018); Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of
Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39 (2014); Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the
Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2019).
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CODA
Two issues that this Article has not broached are the nature of the
new civil religion regime (other than describing it as repudiating the
soft Christian establishment that preceded it), and the implications of
the dynamics between establishment and exemption for law and
culture today. This coda briefly and speculatively addresses both
questions.
Some scholars have already begun to reflect on what that new civil
religion regime is or will be, 193 and those reflections have in turn been
contested, but it seems clear that something new is coming. 194 Sociocultural studies like Tara Isabella Burton’s suggest that the rise of
contemporary “intuitional religion” has taken its cues from, and itself
reinforces, the dismantling of the earlier Christian civil religion. 195
“The kaleidoscopic nature of intuitionalism,” Burton writes,
“necessarily lends itself to fracture, to ever-smaller, ever-moreBut
fragmented, and ever-more-ideologically-aligned tribes.” 196
Burton is somewhat less sure about what it all means for the civil
religion regime to come, hypothesizing a progressive possibility—
“social justice culture”—and a libertarian one—the “Rationalists and
Transhumanists” of Silicon Valley and big tech—as two likely
contenders. 197 These new civil religion possibilities both, in their
respective and different ways, “imbue[] the secular sphere with
meaning,” “reenchant[] a godless world,” and “replicate[] the
cornerstones of traditional religion—meaning, purpose, community,
and ritual—in an internally cohesive way.” 198
This Article takes no strong position on the nature of the
successor civil religion regime. But if pressed to offer a view, one in
some agreement with Burton, I might venture that whatever the new
civil religion is now or will eventually become, it is highly unlikely to be
shaped as a legal matter by the Religion Clauses as historically and
193 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 39.
194 Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Jews, Not Pagans, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
497 (2019). This article deals primarily with the different question of how to understand
the relationship of establishment and free exercise exemption within any political regime,
and within the American context specifically.
195 TARA ISABELLA BURTON, STRANGE RITES: NEW RELIGIONS FOR A GODLESS WORLD
(2020) (documenting the emergence of self-definitional religions of black-pill anarchists,
wives of Severus Snape, Jedis, Proud Boys, juice cleansers, World of Warcrafters, neowitches, wellness industry entrepreneurs, Satanists, new atavists, and a host of others).
196 Id. at 166.
197 Id. at 167–68.
198 Id. at 177–78.
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traditionally interpreted. The Religion Clauses, as historically understood, will not have political priority in any sense—conceptual,
historical, or as a matter of general political significance—for the new
civil religion of the new establishment. The Religion Clauses, after all,
do not sit alone and in splendid isolation from the rest of the
Constitution. 199 Other developments in constitutional law in the midtwentieth century, and especially the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process and Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, as well as the
vast network of nondiscrimination laws that are the issue of that
doctrine and now pockmark the nation, are far likelier to influence the
nature of the new civil religion regime than the Religion Clauses or
the First Amendment more generally.
The Establishment Clause dismantling of the soft Christian civil
religion discussed earlier may well have been conceptually conjoined
to and concurrent with some of the Court’s most influential and widely
celebrated cases in these other areas. Indeed, a great deal of modern
constitutional law that is not conventionally designated “religion
clause” law is nevertheless connected with, and perhaps even in some
sense a conceptual outgrowth of (though the etiology is complex), the
Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause together with free
exercise exemption’s assistance. 200 Especially the assumption that
government may only act for “secular” reasons and the consequent
privatization in America of religion and Christianity in specific. As José
Casanova has put it:
Insofar as freedom of conscience is intrinsically related to ‘the right
to privacy’—to the modern institutionalization of a private sphere
free from governmental intrusion as well as free from ecclesiastical
control—and inasmuch as ‘the right to privacy’ serves as the very
foundation of modern liberalism and of modern individualism,
then indeed the privatization of religion is essential to
modernity. 201

Casanova might as well have made these observations with the Court’s
mid-twentieth-century substantive due process doctrine in mind. Just
as establishment is politically prior to free exercise exemption, these
other parts of constitutional law and the complex and far-reaching
grids of related law that have been generated in their wake—this new
establishment—may well dictate the political terms of the new civil
religion. 202
199 See WALTER BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 46 (1957).
200 See, e.g., Ristroph & Murray, supra note 33 (describing contemporary family law in
just these terms).
201 CASANOVA, supra note 108, at 40.
202 For elaboration on some of these doctrinal relationships, see Marc O. DeGirolami,
Virtue, Freedom, and the First Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1465 (2016).
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As for any concrete implications of establishment’s political
priority to free exercise, it is certainly possible that there will not be
any. Champions of religious liberty will persist in seeking religious
accommodations. Rights constrictors will persist in opposing them
and bemoaning the hypertrophy of individual rights as against the
burgeoning establishment and the new civil religion that they hold
dear. Nobody’s views of religious exemption and no one’s litigation
strategy are likely to change. No court is likely to rule differently in
these conflicts than it would otherwise.
Still, there are some practical developments that might follow. A
first is that those traditionally-minded religious believers—particularly,
but not only, traditional Christians—now on the outside of the new
civil religion should consider whether to accept that they live within a
new establishment that is essentially, and sometimes fiercely, hostile to
their way of life. They are no longer in a struggle to determine the
basic character of the new American political establishment; they lost
that fight. No individual religious exemption from the new regime will
change that, and, as discussed earlier, exemptions may only exacerbate
and entrench their unwelcome new status. 203 It should be clarifying to
contextualize what exemption victories they may win in the future
within the larger landscape of their own regime rout.
Another implication of establishment’s political priority to free
exercise exemption might align with some traditionally-minded
religious claims that rather than investing so much in law and politics,
traditional believers ought to be creating places of sanctuary and
cultural separation for themselves from the new establishment. Rod
Dreher, for example, has argued for the formation of alternative
communities for the traditionally religious and for abandoning the
notion that the fight for Christendom is still ongoing. 204 Others have
insisted in a similar vein that the chase after exemption has become so
hard-fought that religious communities are beginning to believe that
religious freedom is as important as their own substantive religious
commitments, or even that there is no difference between them—as if
freedom itself were the ultimate religious objective. 205 One consequence of the political priority of establishment to free exercise might
be the deflection of some of the energy that the traditionally religious
have invested in exemption into other, perhaps more important,
realms of religious life.
See notes 178–90 and accompanying text.
ROD DREHER, THE BENEDICT OPTION: A STRATEGY FOR CHRISTIANS IN A POSTCHRISTIAN NATION (2017).
205 See, e.g., Yuval Levin, The Perils of Religious Liberty, FIRST THINGS (Feb. 2016),
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2016/02/the-perils-of-religious-liberty
[https://
perma.cc/QB2T-48SN].
203
204
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But perhaps the most intriguing long-term effect of accepting
establishment’s political priority to free exercise might be the eventual
aggregation of religious exemptions into something more than
individualized, essentially powerless, and atomized accommodations.
Into more organized efforts in which clusters of dissenting
communities resist the new establishment by uniting their exemption
victories into longer-term programs of subversion of the new civil
religion. Many religious exemption advocates may not be prepared to
pursue such a strategy, and many are likely uninterested in it,
preferring the politics of the emergent establishment and its civil
religion. But for others, and in time, we might well see the coming of
a new traditionalist disestablishmentarianism. 206
CONCLUSION
Religious exemption’s critics and the growing group of rights
constrictors of which they are a part contend that free exercise
exemption has assumed greater political importance than the
communal values underlying establishment.
They are wrong
conceptually. The establishment, including its civil religion, always
takes political priority to individual rights of religious exemption.
They are wrong historically. The Supreme Court’s twentieth-century
Establishment Clause doctrine, which systematically dismantled the
existing civil religion regime, took political priority to its free exercise
exemption doctrine and set the political terms for it. And they are
wrong today. The recent rise of religious exemption presents no threat
to the civil religion dismantling of the last century, or to the new civil
religion now aborning to replace it. To the contrary, religious
exemption for the groups that seek it today reinforces their status as
outsiders and supplicants in the new establishment. Like all civil
religions before it, the new American civil religion—whatever its
precise shape and commitments—will retain iron political control over
the exceptions to it.

206 For further discussion of this possibility, see Marc O. DeGirolami, Traditionalist
Disestablishments (forthcoming) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).

